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The increasing demand for high-bandwidth applications such as video-on-demand and grid comput-
ing is reviving interest in bandwidth reservation schemes. Earlier attempts did not catch on for a number
of reasons, notably lack of interest on the part of the bandwidth providers. This, in turn, was partially
caused by the lack of an efficient way of charging for bandwidth. Thus, the viability of bandwidth reser-
vation depends on the existence of an efficient market where bandwidth-related transactions can take
place. For this market to be effective, it must be efficient for both the provider (seller) and the user
(buyer) of the bandwidth. This implies that: (a) the buyer must have a wide choice of providers that
operate in a competitive environment, (b) the seller must be assured that a QoS transaction will be paid
by the customer, and (c) the QoS transaction establishment must have low overheads so that it may be
used by individual customers without a significant burden to the provider.
In order to satisfy these requirements, we propose a framework that allows customers to purchase
bandwidth using an open market where providers advertise links and capacities and customers bid for
these services. The model is close to that of a commodities market that offers both advance bookings
(futures) and a spot market. We explore the mechanisms that can support such a model.
1. Introduction
Years of research on Quality of Service (QoS) architectures for the Internet have resulted in sophis-
ticated proposals that have not been broadly exploited commercially. In particular, Integrated Services
(IntServ) [11] and Differentiated Services (DiffServ) [8] have long been supported by major router and
operating system vendors, yet have only seen minimal use in practice. One explanation offered by the
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networking and QoS community has been a lack of a commercialization model, together with the nec-
essary accounting and charging architecture [14]. A related crucial issue is assurance of end-to-end QoS
coherence in the face of multiple intervening parties, such as transit ISPs.
These two issues, taken together, are responsible for suppressing interest from both the ISPs (in com-
mercially exploiting QoS to its full potential) and the users (in taking advantage of such services). Simply
put, if an ISP cannot be paid for reserving bandwidth to a user, they will not offer QoS; if users cannot be
assured of end-to-end QoS, they will not pay for the service. Compounding the problem is the issue of
management: it is certainly possible for a large entity, such as a multi-national company, to coordinate
with the relevant ISPs so that its various geographically dispersed networks are correctly provisioned
using a series of DiffServ or IntServ tunnels. However, the effort is considerable and requires manual
intervention from a number of parties. Perhaps most importantly, the ISPs’ network operations centers
(NOCs) will need to configure the various routers appropriately. Clearly, such an approach will not
scale well if preferentially treated bandwidth is to become a commodity that can be traded, as has been
recognized before [12]. Yet, the increasing use of the Internet for time-sensitive or otherwise critical
applications effectively mandate some form of bandwidth reservation, often for short periods of time
(e.g., watching a movie).
We present a market-based approach to self-managing QoS across multiple ISPs. Our architecture in-
troduces a Bandwidth Exchange (BAND-X), which facilitates the trading of reserved bandwidth between
ISPs and users. This facility allows purchasing bandwidth in advance (effectively creating a “futures”
market for bandwidth) as well as on the “spot” market. Users can select from a range of offerings by var-
ious ISPs to create an end-to-end pipe (with the desired bandwidth and QoS) piece-meal, or can choose
to purchase a complete package from a single provider (or consortium of providers), where available.
This is similar to the way people purchase low-cost airplane tickets online.
To ease the task of accounting and administration, we use the micropayment architecture introduced
in [10] to provide both accounting and authorization. Briefly, users purchasing bandwidth on BAND-X
are provided with credentials that allow them to establish the necessary QoS pipes among the necessary
network elements (routers), within the constraints of their contracts. Our use of a trust-management
system (KeyNote [9]) allows us to perform both billing and authorization with the same mechanism,
simplifying the architecture and eliminating the need for manual configuration or universal trust of the
BAND-X service (e.g., to configure the relevant routers of several ISPs).
To better illustrate the use of the BAND-X architecture, we next describe a sample usage scenario
involving an end user and several ISPs. In Section 2 we present the system architecture in more detail.
Section 3 describes the various components of our system, in particular our micro-checks mechanism,
and how they operate together, along with a security analysis. Section 4 describes our prototype imple-
mentation, the testbed used for the evaluation, and the measurements collected during the tests we run.
Finally, summarize related work in Section 5, and present our conclusions and closing remarks.
1.1. Motivation
QoS provision and management has a wide-ranging literature. A lot of the early work was inspired
by the QoS features of ATM networks, and the demand for multimedia traffic. The desired goal was
the control of multiplexing behavior in both endpoints and network elements, with the idea that queuing
disciplines such as Fair Queuing, or its many variants could be used to allocate bandwidth resources,
and for the most part provide delay bounds.
However, despite the ever increasing use of time-sensitive protocols (e.g., VoIP, audio on demand,
etc.) bandwidth reservation has not been particularly successful. This has been caused mainly by the
fear that since these applications have modest bandwidth requirements the operation of a reservation
and payment infrastructure would not be feasible economically. Recently, however, newer applications
such as video on demand, tele-presence, and Grid Computing, have bandwidth requirements that may
constitute a significant portion of the available bandwidth. In such cases the overheads associated with
the reservation and billing are smaller (because we are dealing with fewer more expensive reservations),
while the benefits are greater because of the impact of the data flows on the infrastructure.
Nowadays, with newer applications such as video on demand, tele-presence, and Grid Computing, the
unit of allocation is large enough to allow a relatively smaller number of higher value transactions that
place reasonable demands on the reservation and payment components of a reservation system. Such a
system must deal with billing (i.e., how the cost of the reserved bandwidth can be paid by the user) and
must support a reservation protocol such as RSVP that can perform bandwidth reservation in a scalable
and secure manner.
Consider the following scenario of a user Alice wishing to reserve an end-to-end 50Mbps “pipe” from
Rome to Dublin1. Using an appropriate tool (e.g., auction site, database, service bureau) she decides to
purchase a link from Rome to Paris offered by ISP A, and another link from Paris to Dublin offered by
ISP B. However, Alice does not need the QoS pipe immediately; rather, she needs it for the time her
remote presentation is scheduled, a few days later.
Payment may be effected in various ways (examples given later in the paper) depending on the policy
of each ISP. Once the reservation has been booked, each ISP sends a credential to Alice authorizing her
to use the required link at the desired time and date and for the appropriate time interval. The credentials
are set to expire at the end of the reserved period. Again, depending on the way payment is handled and
the policies of the ISPs and other involved parties, more than these two credentials may be required for
access to be granted (this is explained later).
Just before the link needs to be established, Alice’s QoS negotiation agent (QNA) will send a QoS
request to the network elements (NEs) of the two ISPs to ensure that the appropriate resources have
been allocated. Since two providers are involved, Alice’s QNA will need to contact each ISP separately.
Depending on the bandwidth reservation protocol used, Alice’s QNA may communicate with a central
entity within the ISP, or may negotiate a path through the ISP’s network and then reserve the desired
bandwidth with each network element separately.
For this discussion, we have limited ourselves to bandwidth reservation; additional QoS requirements
(such as latency) may be specified within the same framework.
Spot Market Given an efficient purchasing mechanism, an “advance” booking such as the one men-
tioned earlier may be made even seconds before the channel will be used, so the term “spot market” is
used to define a different payment regime that may be used to sell the unused network capacity. The “spot
market” allows premium best-effort services to be sold. In this case, we are not making any promises
regarding availability of bandwidth, but we say that by paying a small premium, packets may be treated
favorably in the allocation of the remaining bandwidth (after the booked commitments are served).
1We use geographical identifiers instead of IP addresses to simplify the example.
2. Architecture
2.1. Operation of the Spot Market
Initially, the various bandwidth providers post their available capacities in the BAND-X clearing
house. The system can accommodate one or more such clearing houses, since they function as an-
nouncement boards. Apart from that, the clearing house is not involved in the purchase of bandwidth
(see Figure 1), but may provide (and charge for) secondary services such as monitoring and reputa-
tion/complaints tracking for the participating ISPs, akin to the way commodity markets operators moni-
tor the participating traders.
Figure 1. The BAND-X Clearing House acts as a repository of all the offers for bandwidth issued by
the ISPs.
The postings are of the form of credentials that describe the identity of the ISP and promise to abide
by a set of QoS specifications between two points of the ISPs network. The credential may also contain
the time period that the offer is valid (which may be different from the expiration of the credential), the
price of the concession, and additional ISP-related information, such as the path that should be taken
between the two points. Offer credentials are signed by the ISP who issues them.
Customers contact the Clearing House to collect offers from the ISPs. For complex paths, a customer
may need to collect more than one offer and use them together. It is the responsibility of the customer (or
someone acting on their behalf) to make the appropriate reservations. In an environment with a single
clearing house, the customer can issue queries to get lists of offers matching his or her requirements. If
there are many clearing houses, the customer may dispatch an intelligent agent to collect the offers and
come back with a recommendation that meets preassigned constraints (price, ISP reliability etc.), query
each clearing house independently, or use a meta-search engine.
At the end of the search, the customer will hold one or more offer credentials that describe the desired
path and QoS specs, as shown in Figure 2.
At this point, the customer has not actually purchased the bandwidth. In order to issue payment and
reserve the bandwidth, a number of steps have to be taken. The customer (or the host at one of the
end-points of the connection) contacts the first-hop network element (NE) and activates the reservation
protocol. The NE issues a challenge which is then returned signed by the customer. This response also
contains the offer credentials collected by the customer and a credit-worthiness credential issued by the
customer’s credit institution, as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 2. Customer finalizes the path selection by downloading the offer credentials.
Figure 3. The customer issues a reservation request by sending the offer credentials collected from
the BAND-X Clearing House along with a credit-worthiness credential issued by his or her credit
institution.
This exchange accomplishes the following: (a) identifies the customer (the key that has signed the
NE challenge), (b) provides proof of good standing (the credential issued by the credit institution to the
customer’s key), (c) limits payment only to the offer credentials provided, (d) can be used only for that
particular transaction since it depends on the challenge issued by the NE. On the basis of this transaction,
the first hop NE contacts other NEs within the ISPs network establishing the purchased path. If the path
crosses ISP boundaries, additional transactions have to be carried out between the NE of the new ISP
and the end user, as shown in Figure 4.If an ISP in the path cannot provide the requested bandwidth, the
client may have to cancel existing reservations and try to find (and negotiate) another path.
When the last hop is reached, the connection is considered established and the final destination host
can initiate a connection with the customer’s host over the reserved path (Figure 5).
There is no need for the ISPs offers to match exactly the requirements of the customer. For example,
if Alice requires a 50Mbps link from Atlanta to Dublin, she may use an offer for a 100Mbps connection,
but purchase only 50Mbps. The providers may include clauses in their offer credentials allowing or
prohibiting such un-bundling. The flexibility of the policy language used in BAND-X allows many
such special considerations to be encoded within the offer credentials. The advantage of having these
restrictions expressed as policy is that they can be used directly by the ISP’s infrastructure without any
need for conversion. Moreover, the customer cannot alter these restrictions since they are an integral
part of the credential (and are protected by the ISP’s signing of the offer credentials).
Figure 4. Each time the path crosses ISP boundaries, additional negotiations have to be carried out, to
ensure that the next-hop ISP can be paid for passage.
Figure 5. The path has now been established and communication can proceed.
2.2. Operation of the Futures Market
In the Spot Market, the customer collects the offers and sets up the path in short order, because the
offers are effective immediately and have a short lifetime. There is no need to negotiate with the ISPs
before the reservation.
In the Futures Market the situation is different, since the ISPs need to know what bandwidth has been
purchased to plan their resource allocation. Once the customer collects the offers, a notional reservation
negotiation will be initiated. The negotiation is notional because no state changes are actually effected
on the network elements. The customer’s QNA will not detect any change in the negotiation. Within the
ISPs network, no path is created; rather the reservation is entered in the ISP’s database, and a reservation
credential is sent to the end user. This credential will then be used in the same manner as the offer
credential was used in the Spot Market scenario. Since the bandwidth has been paid for, the reservation
credential commits the ISPs to provide the requested resources at the appropriate future time.
At that time (when the path is actually required) the customer initiates a reservation negotiation, but
sends only the reservation credential (instead of the offer and credit institution credentials). The ISP
network elements will reserve the path as specified in the reservation credential. The case of multiple
ISPs is handled in a similar manner. For popular, pre-planned events, it is possible that groups of ISPs
will create bundles (represented by groups of credentials) that allow for the creation of paths that are
predicted to be in high demand, e.g., a path from a large residential ISP to a streaming-content provider,
perhaps for the duration of an online music concert.
2.3. Role of the Credit Institution
Like the Clearing House, there is no requirement to have a single Credit Institution. It is, however,
important that the ISPs have a way of confirming the keys of the various Credit Institutions. This is
because the credit-worthiness credentials (CWCs) issued by the Credit Institutions to their customers
will have to be verified by each ISP. If an ISP cannot verify a CWC, then it may be fake; trusting it may
result in the equivalent of a bounced check. Furthermore, ISPs may contact the Credit Institution to verify
that a user has sufficient funds to pay for a particular transaction (similar to credit card authorization),
which means that the Credit Institutions need to be online. However, the interaction between ISPs and
Credit Institution is relatively simple, and the experience from real-life credit card payment processors
indicate that the infrastructure can scale well.
3. Implementation
3.1. KeyNote Microchecks
The micro-payments system introduced in [10] forms the basis of our approach. The general archi-
tecture of this micro-billing system is shown in Figure 6. Under BAND-X, a Merchant is an ISP selling






Figure 6. Microbilling architecture diagram.
In this system, Provisioning issues KeyNote [9] credentials to users (Payers) and ISPs (Merchants).
These credentials describe the conditions under which a user is allowed to perform a transaction (i.e.,
the user’s credit limit) and the fact that a Merchant is authorized to participate in a particular transaction.
Initially, the ISP encodes the details of the available bandwidth into an offer which is uploaded to
the BAND-X site, along with a credential that authorizing any user to utilize the bandwidth under the
same conditions as those enclosed in the offer. Once the user finds an offer (and associated credential)
that is acceptable, she must issue to the ISP a microcheck for this offer. The microchecks are encoded
as KeyNote credentials that authorize payment for a specific transaction. The user creates a KeyNote
credential signed with her private key and sends it, along with her credential from Provisioning, to the
first network element of the ISP. This credential is effectively a check signed by the user (the Authorizer)
and payable to the ISP (the Licensee). The conditions under which this check is valid match the offer
sent to the user by the ISP. Part of the offer is a nonce, which maps payments to specific transactions,
and prevents double-depositing of microchecks by the ISP.
To determine whether he can expect to be paid (and therefore whether to accept the payment), the ISP
passes the action description (the attributes and values in the offer) and the user’s key along with the
ISP’s policy (that identifies the Provisioning key), the user credential (signed by BAND-X ), the offer
credential (signed by the ISP), and the microchecks credential (signed by the user) to his local KeyNote
compliance checker. If the compliance checker authorizes the transaction, the ISP is guaranteed that
Provisioning will allow payment. The correct linkage among the Merchant’s policy, the Provisioning
key, the user key, and the transaction details follow from KeyNote’s semantics [9]. If the transaction is
approved, the ISP can configure the appropriate routers such that the user’s traffic is treated according to
the offer, and store a copy of the microcheck along with the user credential and associated offer details
for later settlement and payment.
Periodically, the ISP will ‘deposit’ the microchecks (and associated transaction details) he has col-
lected to the Clearing and Settlement Center (CSC). The CSC may or may not be run by the same
company as the Provisioning, but it must have the proper authorization to transmit billing and payment
records to the Provisioning for the customers. The CSC receives payment records from the various ISPs;
these records consist of the offer, and the KeyNote microcheck and credential from the user sent in
response to the offer. In order to verify that a microcheck is good, the CSC goes through a similar pro-
cedure as the ISP did when accepting the microcheck. If the KeyNote compliance checker approves, the
check is accepted. Using her public key as an index, the user’s account is debited for the amount of the
transaction. Similarly, the ISP’s account is credited for the same amount.
3.2. BAND-X Operation
Having seen the overall system architecture, let us look at a particular example. Alice is a user who
wants to reserve some bandwidth for a particular link with Nick’s ISP. Every evening Alice contacts her
banker and obtains a fresh Check Guarantor credential, which allows her to issue KeyNote microchecks.
The CG credential shown below (most of the base64 digits from the keys have been removed for brevity)
allows Alice to write checks for up to 5 US Dollars, and she can do so until March 24th, 2006.
Keynote-Version: 2
Local-Constants:
ALICE KEY = "rsa-base64:MCgCIQ...
CG KEY = "rsa-base64:MIGJAo..."
Authorizer: CG KEY
Licensees: ALICE KEY
Conditions: app domain == "Band-X" &&
currency == "USD" && &amount <= 5.00
&& date <= "20060324" -> "true";
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:QU6SZ..."
Alice now wants to reserve some bandwidth to Dublin. She searches BAND-X for a suitable offer, and
locates one issued by Nick’s ISP that contains the following Offer Credential, indicating that she could
purchase 50Mbps on the specific link (“Dublin-NYC”) for 3 US dollars:
Keynote-Version: 2
Local-Constants:
ISP KEY = "rsa-base64:7231f..."
ROUTE KEY = "rsa-base64:33a41..."
Authorizer: ISP KEY
Licensees: ROUTE KEY
Conditions: app domain == "Band-X" &&
currency == "USD" &&
bandwidth <= "50Mbps" &&
link name == "Dublin-NYC" &&
&amount >= 3.00
&& date < "20061120" -> "true";
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:ab1XXA..."
As we shall see later, in practice an Offer Credential includes QoS attributes, such as bandwidth, using
the Intserv FLOWSPEC notation defined in RFC 2210.
With the offer credential on hand, Alice then writes a check for the appropriate amount:
Keynote-Version: 2
Local-Constants:
ALICE KEY = "rsa-base64:Mcg..."
ISP KEY = "rsa-base64:7231f..."
Authorizer: ALICE KEY
Licensees: ISP KEY
Conditions: app domain == "BAND-X" &&
currency == "USD" && amount == "4.25"
&& nonce == "eb2c3dfc8e9a" &&
date == "20060324" -> "true";
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:Qsd..."
The nonce is a random number that must be different for each check, guaranteeing that there will be
no double-depositing of checks. Alice then sends the Offer Credential and the micro-check to Nick’s
router using a protocol such as RSVP. Nick receives these credentials, validates the microcheck to make
sure that he will get paid, and configures the router appropriately. If the check is not good, Nick will say
so, and refuse to make the reservation. Nick will verify that he will get paid, and will evaluate the Offer
Credential and the microcheck using a simple policy such as:
Keynote-Version: 2
Local-Constants:
NICK KEY = "rsa-base64:7231f..."
CG KEY = "rsa-base64:MIGJAo..."
Authorizer: POLICY
Licensees: CG KEY && NICK KEY
Conditions:
app domain == "BAND-X" -> "true";
This policy says that anything that Nick’s key and the Check Guarantor’s key jointly authorize is
allowed. Thus, Alice must submit a valid payment and a valid Offer Credential. Since the bandwidth
was paid for, and a path can be found from POLICY to a user (Alice) that has delegated to Nick’s
key, which in turn has created an open-access Offer Credential, the operation is allowed. As a matter
of business practice, Nick may require periodic payments from Alice in order to keep the bandwidth
reserved. Alice must know that and send microchecks at the appropriate intervals.
If additional routers need to be configured in Nick’s ISP, the first router forwards the necessary infor-
mation to the next. Note that it is not necessary for the router itself to perform the signature verifications
and policy validations: it can simply refer these operations to a Policy Decision Point (PDP), as is
envisioned by the IntServ architecture.
3.3. Security Analysis
Similar to previous work on credential-based micropayments [10, 24], our system has three types of
communication: provisioning, reconciliation, and transaction. Although delegation of credentials (and
thus access rights to reserved bandwidth) is possible, we do not consider it in this paper. We shall not
worry about any value transfers to banks, as there already exist systems for handling those (those used by
e-commerce sites, for example). All communications between BAND-X, ISPs, and users can be protected
with existing protocols such as IPsec or TLS. This covers both provisioning and reconciliation, which
occur off-line from the actual bandwidth reservation and use. Furthermore, the transactions themselves
(establishing the QoS pipes, or the right to use existing pipes) can be protected through the same means;
the only requirement is that the user can authenticate with each ISP.
The confidentiality of the transmitted data itself is not within the purview of our system, nor is it
a responsibility of the ISP; if the users do not trust the network with respect to data confidentiality
or integrity, they should use end-to-end security protocols, e.g., IPsec or TLS. We do not impose any
limitations that would preclude the use of these protocols.
The user needs to ensure that the ISPs provide the promised service. This can be easily verified by
the user using a number of existing protocols and tools [28, 7]. Protecting against over-charging ISPs is
also straightforward: the details of each transaction can be verified at any point in time, by verifying the
credentials and the offer. Since only the user can create microchecks, a dispute claim can be resolved
by “running” the transaction again. Thus, the user is safe even from a collusion between any number of
ISPs and the BAND-X service. The ISP must ensure that they are paid for the services offered. Since it
has a copy of all transactions (the BAND-X credential, the microcheck, and the offer), it can prove to the
BAND-X, or any other party, that a transaction was in fact performed.
The Credit Institution also needs to be paid for the services offered. Since it handles the microchecks,
the ISP has to provide the transaction logs to it. The Credit Institution can then verify that a transaction
was done, and at what value. A collusion between the ISP and a user is somewhat self-contradicting:
the user’s goal is to minimize cost, while the ISP’s is to maximize revenue, each at the expense of the
other. The function of the Credit Institution is to verify each transaction (perhaps sampling, for very
large numbers of transactions), debit the ISP and credit the user (presumably keeping some commission
or small fee in the process): if the ISP does not give any credentials to the Credit Institution, then no work
was done as far as the latter is concerned (and no payments are made, which benefits the user); claiming
more transactions than really happened is not in the best interest of the user (so no collaboration could
be expected in the direction), and the ISP cannot “fabricate” transactions. Since value is not stored in
either the ISP or the user, only a reliable log of the transactions is needed at the ISP (and, optionally, at
the user).
4. Prototype
This section describes our prototype implementation and the environment we used to create a small-
scale network to test our implementation. We describe two experiments we ran on our testbed and
provide measurements indicating the performance of our prototype in normal reservation situations as
well as fault-recovery situations. We based our prototype on ISI’s implementation of the RSVP proto-
col [2], because we did not wish to implement yet another reservation protocol. Nevertheless, we are
confident that our concept and mechanism will work with other reservation protocols as well.
4.1. RSVP
The Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) is the quality of service signaling protocol we have chosen
to support the test implementation of the BAND-X architecture. RSVP is a receiver oriented signaling
protocol that allows receivers to request QoS reservations along a network path to any number of senders.
The RSVP protocol begins with the senders generating PATH messages that travel through the network
downstream to the receivers. PATH messages include information regarding the kind of traffic that the
senders will generate and details about the routers along the reservation path. Receivers then generate
RESV messages that are sent upstream to the senders specifying the QoS they wish to reserve on each
router along the way.
RSVP messages are composed of objects that specify important parameters for the reservation ex-
change. Two of these objects, RSVP’s FLOWSPEC and POLICY DATA, are relevant to our implementation
discussion. A FLOWSPEC contains the requested QoS parameters and the POLICY DATA object contains
information regarding authorization policies for the request. These objects are both checked before a
reservation is made to ensure that the request is possible. RSVP uses the FLOWSPEC in admission control
to check whether the router actually supports and has adequate resources for the desired QoS. Addition-
ally, policy control checks whether the reservation is authorized using the information contained within
the POLICY DATA object and most likely, a local policy. Both objects were designed to be completely
opaque to the RSVP specification. That is, RSVP was not designed for a specific QoS or policy model
so that it could be extended easily for future QoS and policy control services. RFC 2210 specifies an
implementation of IETF Integrated Services with RSVP which is probably the most common form of the
FLOWSPEC in current implementations. Our test implementation uses the POLICY DATA object to con-
vey policy information for the BAND-X architecture. RFC 2750 describes the POLICY DATA object as
being composed of any number of policy elements. The information within these elements is application
defined and is not dictated by RSVP.
4.2. Implementation
The test implementation we have developed is a modified release of ISI’s RSVP distribution (release
4.2a4) [2]. In addition to the BAND-X specific code, development included significant changes to the
RSVP daemon and test applications to provide support for protocol features that were not yet imple-
mented. The development process included: (a) the design of a BAND-X Policy Element containing
information used for QoS authorization, (b) adding support to the ISI code for the passing of these
policy objects during the reservation exchange, and (c) BAND-X specific logic to process the newly
supported policy data and make security decisions accordingly.
Figure 7. RTAP places credentials into a BAND-X Policy Element, packages it into a RAPI Policy Struc-
ture, and makes a reservation request via the API. The RAPI Policy Structure is then sent to the daemon
within an API reservation request. Finally, the Daemon puts the BAND-X Policy Element into a POL-
ICY DATA object and adds it to the outgoing RSVP RESV packet.
4.2.1 BAND-X Policy Element
All information needed for policy decisions within the BAND-X architecture is encapsulated into a pol-
icy element. This structure is packaged in a POLICY DATA object and passed along the reservation route
within the RESV message. Our BAND-X policy element is actually very simple. It contains any num-
ber of KeyNote credentials that are used to specify policy information and requirements for all parties
concerned with the reservation. Each credential is stored simply as ASCII data and a corresponding
unsigned integer specifying its length. A set of these credential structures are placed in sequence and
another unsigned integer specifies how many there are. The unsigned integer values are encoded into
a portable representation (we use Sun’s XDR format, RFC 1014) because RSVP itself cannot know the
details of the object and therefore it cannot ensure correct byte ordering. The ASCII data is not encoded
or compressed in any way.
4.2.2 Adding Policy Control Support to ISI’s RSVP
The ISI RSVP distribution, as well as many other implementations, lack support for the policy control
mechanisms specified in RFC 2205 and RFC 2750. Providing the bare minimum of these features was
needed to allow the transport of our BAND-X policy elements along the reservation path. While the ISI
code did provide declarations for the key policy control data structures, we still had to add code to all
of the major components of the system. Figure 7 represents an overview of these modifications in the
context of ISI’s RSVP distribution.
The first such component was the RSVP Test Application (RTAP). RTAP is an application that in-
terfaces with the RSVP daemon process and is used to control a reservation session. RTAP provides a
set of commands for creating and closing sessions, sending PATH messages downstream, and of course
sending RESV messages to signal a QoS request. In order to pass our policy objects into the daemon
process we needed to first provide RTAP commands to specify this. By adding an extra argument to the
RTAP reservation command we were able to specify a directory to the application that holds a set of files
containing all necessary data for the desired BAND-X policy element. Specifically, these files are just
ASCII KeyNote credentials. Our modified RTAP application examines this directory and composes the
appropriate BAND-X policy element. This structure is then XDR encoded and placed inside an interme-
diate object defined by the RSVP API (RAPI). A pointer to this intermediate RAPI policy object is then
passed as an argument to RAPI.
The only significant change made to RAPI was inside the code for the rapi reserve() call. The ISI
implementation of this routine would simply assume that the RAPI policy object it received via argument
was NULL. We modified this behavior to add the policy object to the reservation request sent to the RSVP
daemon. A simple routine copies the RAPI policy object into the reservation request structure using a
memcpy. The reservation request structure is then sent over an IPC socket to the daemon process.
The daemon process is waiting on the other end of this socket for any API requests made through
RAPI. Upon receiving a reservation request, the daemon has a structure that contains a copy of the RAPI
policy object. Within this object is our own BAND-X policy element constructed earlier within RTAP. At
this point the reservation request is translated from an API request to a standard RSVP RESV packet. The
daemon treats this newly created packet as if it has arrived from another router, except for the fact that
it is in host byte order. We translate the RAPI policy object into the standardized RSVP POLICY DATA
object that is a part of the RESV message. This requires yet another memcpy of the opaque BAND-X
policy element to the POLICY DATA structure. After this copy the POLICY DATA object is inside an
RESV packet that can be sent to the next router in the path.
The final major modification involved changing how RESV packets (received either from a router or
from an API request) are processed. To add support for policy control we first check to see if the packet
contains any POLICY DATA objects. If so, we pass these objects to a newly created policy control mod-
ule. The policy control module that we have implemented is very limited as it only currently supports
our BAND-X policy elements, though it could be modified to support others with minimal effort. The
policy control module uses a value within the POLICY DATA object’s header called the P-Type to de-
termine what kind of policy element is inside. Every type of opaque policy element is given a unique
P-Type value so that RSVP will be able to pass it to a separate module of code that knows how to deal
with that element specifically. When the P-Type specifies a BAND-X element the policy control module
passes it to the appropriate BAND-X processing routine. The entire process, both the BAND-X process-
ing and policy control, return either a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response. Based on this response the daemon either
goes on with the reservation process or generates a policy reservation error message. This error (or any
reservation error), in turn, may trigger the cancellation of recently made reservations and the acquisition
of fresh credentials (perhaps through a different set of ISPs). It is important to note that this policy
control check happens before the admission control check. That is, we check if the user is allowed to
make the reservation within the BAND-X system before the check for whether the router even has the
resources for the reservation. If there are multiple POLICY DATA objects within the RESV message we
keep checking them until either they all pass or one fails.
4.2.3 BAND-X Processing and Decision Making
When the BAND-X logic is invoked by policy control it has one goal to accomplish; using the policy
information given, make a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decision as to whether the customer is authorized to make this
reservation. Fortunately, the use of KeyNote credentials to specify BAND-X policy makes this process
very simple. First, we need to decode the BAND-X policy object from its XDR representation to the
host’s. Second, we need to initialize the KeyNote trust management engine and pass it the appropriate
credentials, authorizer, and action attribute set. The first credential that is given to the engine is not
actually part of the BAND-X object, it is the Local Policy that resides somewhere on the filesystem.
This Local Policy is at the highest level of trust and authorizes entities such as the ISP and various credit
institutions. Additionally, the public key of our “stub” action authorizer is stored locally and must be
added to KeyNote’s list of authorizers. The role of this key is explained in detail within the discussion
of credentials used in the BAND-X system. We then add all of the credentials contained within the
BAND-X policy element to the KeyNote engine.
The final step is to submit all the appropriate values as an action attribute set to KeyNote. To ensure
that the reservation is for the appropriate QoS, all parameters within the FLOWSPEC for the reservation
are submitted as well. Because KeyNote only supports strings for its action attributes we must convert
the floating point and integer values of the Intserv flowspec to string representations. This is done
simply by using an appropriate call to sprintf. The code is capable of handling both guaranteed and
controlled load QoS requests. Once the action attribute set is complete we issue a query to the KeyNote
engine and it provides us with the ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to whether the reservation is authorized. This
answer is returned to policy control and then to the RSVP reservation code.
4.2.4 Limitations
A serious consideration during the design and implementation of the prototype was to keep it simple
by concentrating only on BAND-X-related aspects. Thus, while the implementation we have developed,
works adequately for our testing needs, it does have several important limitations.
• Our prototype intentionally avoids implementing the full RSVP policy control capability, as de-
scribed in RFC 2205 and RFC 2750. Rather, it concentrates on the exchange of the required
BAND-X policy information to each router along the reservation path. Features, such as POL-
ICY DATA options, which are unrelated to BAND-X operation were not implemented.
• Policy control for multicast reservations was not considered as it is outside the scope of our pro-
totype. We expect that multicast will play an important role in ensuring efficient use of network
resources if/when the Internet becomes a significant real-time digital content delivery system.
Multicast would make pricing much more variable, since the cost of a reservation in a particular
link is amortized over the number of customers subscribing to that reservation. This introduces
several challenges, which we leave for future work.
• Policy control is only implemented for RESV messages since the BAND-X architecture does not
need policy information within any other type of RSVP messages.
• Error messages generated by policy control failures do not explain how the policy actually failed.
Normally, reservation error messages are supposed to contain information saying specifically how
the policy failed. Unfortunately, KeyNote does not always report why an action was not authorized
by the policy, so the transmission of detailed failure messages is not always possible.
• Although our system can handle link failures within the same ISP (as we show experimentally in
Section 4.4), failures in the links between ISPs require the customer to take action to create a new
path. Depending on the details of the Service Level Agreement (SLA) that accompanies the path
reservation, one or both ISP may instead assume the risk of link failure and create a new path on




Our experiments assume the typical situation where two users wish to establish a path over a number of
distinct but interconnected networks. The BAND-X system will then have to negotiate a path over these
networks thus creating the link between the two users.
We used our network testbed (NEST) which provides the infrastructure for research in various areas
related to networking and network security. The NEST equipment centers on a cluster of 12 machines
connected into an adaptable network topology. The machines can accommodate various configurations
so that each machine can serve as a network endpoint or an active network element (e.g., router, firewall,
etc.). The flexibility of this network provides the enabling infrastructure for research in a number of
areas within the overall framework of network security and educational opportunities for under-graduate
and graduate students.
The Network Security Testbed can simulate accurately various network topologies and configurations.
All the computers have multiple network interfaces so that they can assume the role of routers, bridges,
firewalls, or other network elements. The interconnection of all the computers is handled by a high-end
Ethernet switch that functions as a virtual plug-board. By changing the configuration of the switch,
we can simulate different network topologies without any actual re-wiring. For example, consider the
network topology shown on the left side of Figure 8. We can simulate this topology through a set of
Ethernet broadcast domains (VLAN configurations), as shown on the right side diagram of Figure 8.
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Figure 8. Arbitrary topologies (left) can be represented by configuring VLANs on the Ethernet switch
(right).
Some nodes can also be used to impose restrictions on the bandwidth associated with paths that go




































Figure 9. Network used for the BAND-X tests.
Figure 9, shows the topology of the network used to carry out the experiments discussed below. The
network consists of three end-nodes (nodes 1, 2 and 7), four nodes acting as routers (nodes 3, 4, 5, and
6). There are also two dummynet nodes that may be used to create disruptions in the data flow. The
dummynet nodes are configured as switches, thus they do not require IP addresses, and they do not take
part in the RSVP negotiation.
The test layout allows two paths to be created between the two endpoints, thus providing the ability
to test the response of the system to network disruptions. The shaded areas define different IP networks,
connected by hosts acting as routers. Each node is a single Dell PowerEdge 1550 with an Intel Pentium
III (927.11-MHz 686-class CPU) and 256MB RAM.
4.3.2 Normal Reservation Scenario
In this experiment we measure the time taken to create a new path over the network. The intent is to
quantify the overhead that we have added to ISI’s RSVP implementation. We decided to take timing
measurements on a single node along the reservation path. Since the BAND-X processing in the current
implementation is practically identical for all hops along the path, recording the computing time at one
should give an accurate picture of the complexity per node in a BAND-X enabled RSVP path. We have
measured the time it takes from when a RSVP RESV packet is received by the daemon until the time it
is forwarded to the next hop. This “in-and-out time” is a sufficient measure because it includes both
BAND-X processing and memory copying time.
Figure 10 represents two sets of data. Both sets are the RESV packet in-and-out times as described
before. One is the time taken with BAND-X processing enabled. That is, these are measurements of
the complete working BAND-X prototype implementation and all the decision making code that this
involves. The other set of times is of a system that skips any of the policy decisions that are made in the
BAND-X system. We show timings for different RSVP RESV messages containing increasing numbers
of credentials. The first message is 2612 bytes and contains exactly 3 credentials. This accurately
reflects the approximate minimum message size for any BAND-X enabled reservation in the currently
implemented system. This, however, depends highly on particulars such as the cryptographic key length
chosen. For this test we used RSA with 512-bit keys encoded into base64 ASCII text. Each additional set
of measurements adds a single credential to the policy object. This credential is essentially a direct copy
of the BAND-X offer credential. The credential itself if 936 bytes, and thus the packet size increases
uniformly linearly.
Number of Packet Size (bytes) Mean Time ± 95% CI Mean Time ± 95% CI Mean
Credentials With BAND-X (usec) Without BAND-X (usec) Difference (usec)
3 2612 4243.69 ± 26.42 2015.14 ± 15.32 2228.55
4 3548 4908.68 ± 21.24 2039.33 ± 15.52 2869.35
5 4484 5589.59 ± 22.69 2060.68 ± 11.90 3528.91
6 5420 6248.29 ± 26.31 2097.92 ± 40.33 4150.37
7 6356 6897.98 ± 23.21 2099.61 ± 21.07 4798.37
The overhead the BAND-X code adds to the reservation process can be gleaned by examining the
average difference between the times for each size. As packet size increases, there appears to be a
slight growth in the computing time of ISI’s RSVP daemon that does not include the final BAND-X
processing and decision making code. This growth appears to be fairly negligible when compared to that

















RSVP RESV Packet Size (bytes)
Time vs. RSVP RESV Packet Size
With Band-X Processing
Without Band-X Processing
Figure 10. Times elapsed between receiving and forwarding of RSVP RESV packets. The X-Axis shows
the number of credentials within messages. All measurements taken at a single node along the reserva-
tion path. One hundred samples were taken for each credential set. In addition, a linear fit is depicted.
The machine was a Dell PowerEdge 1550 with an Intel Pentium III (927.11-MHz 686-class CPU) and
256MB RAM.
within the BAND-X processing routines. The setup and query that is performed with the KeyNote Trust
Management Engine accounts for most of the overhead. This involves going through each credential,
adding it to the KeyNote session, and then invoking the KeyNote query itself. The apparent linear growth
as a function of the packet size, or more accurately, the number of credentials within the RSVP packet,
is a result of the linear complexity of the KeyNote query and these memory copies.
The data also shows that there does not seem to be a great deal of cost for larger RESV packets in
the non-BAND-X related code of ISI’s RSVP daemon. This allows us to concentrate specifically on
the BAND-X decision and processing code that is called at the moment of reservation. Optimizations
should target this portion of the code as it is the obvious bottleneck. One obvious optimization would
be to develop a slightly more sophisticated policy object that identified which sets of credentials were
applicable to particular domains. Currently, we just add every credential that is in the policy object to
the keynote session and let keynote sort out which ones are applicable to the decision. Results from the
experiment show that this approach is costly. A better approach would be to pack the credentials with
information that indicated what domain they were for. With that approach, we would expect to see a
Sign Verify Sig/sec Ver/sec
0.0037 sec 0.0002 sec 270 5055
Table 1. Signing and verification times for 1024-bit RSA keys.
constant processing cost equivalent to the 3 credential range. This type of simple optimization would
greatly improve the computational scalability of the system.
It is important to note that the above analysis does not provide any consideration for impact that
the increased RSVP RESV packet size has on network transmission latency. With an increase in packet
size by a rough factor of at least 20, this should perhaps be taken into account. Compression of the
credentials could mitigate this overhead. In addition, credentials can be dropped from the policy object
as it is forwarded through a new domain. This particular optimization theoretically would allow the
RSVP message to shrink as it goes through the path.
Despite the significant increase in processing latency, we believe that this overhead is acceptable in
most of the scenarios where BAND-X would be used, since the setup cost would be amortized over a
long-lived session. The primary reason for minimizing this overhead is to allow for quick path recon-
struction when a failure occurs. We believe that the optimizations we identified above are promising in
minimizing (but not altogether eliminating) overheads.
To provide a more complete overhead analysis, we measured the number of public key verifications
we can perform, which indicates how many credentials/payments the back-end systems (payment infras-
tructure) can validate per unit time. We used a 3 GHz Pentium4 processor machine running Linux with
the OpenSSL V 0.9.7c library for the measurements. As shown in Table 1, a single such system can val-
idate over 5,000 credentials per second. Assuming a scenario where reservations utilize 20 links within
a single ISP, that ISP’s back-end system would be able to process 250 such reservations per second. If a
higher load is expected, it is relatively straightforward to use hardware cryptographic accelerators [26]
or add more back-end processing systems.
4.4. Recovery from Route Failure
In this experiment we investigate the response of the system in the event of a change in the routing
path. Such changes may be due to external factors (e.g., link failure) that affect an already established
reservation. This experiment uses the BAND-X system to reserve a path over our testbed network with
a redundant route. We then simulate a route failure over the reserved path and examine RSVP’s and
BAND-X’s ability to recover, re-propagate, and establish a new reservation along the alternative path.
Finally, we provide some rough timings to give an idea of the service interruptions that might occur with
such a scenario.
4.4.1 Procedure
The test begins with the BAND-X enabled RSVP daemon being run on all nodes in the network with the
exception Node 2, whose role will be explained later. The dummynet bridges are unused in the exercise,
RSVP is not running on them and no reservations are made on their interfaces. Node 1 is designated the
RSVP receiver and Node 7 the sender. The process begins with Node 7 sending a RSVP PATH message
addressed to the receiver of the RSVP session, Node 1. This PATH message propagates through the



































Figure 11. Initial path from Node 7 to Node 1.
This PATH message is forwarded through the network along the highlighted path based upon the ker-
nel routing tables, not by any intervention from RSVP or BAND-X. The PATH message does not contain
any BAND-X related information and is completely unchanged from how the original ISI’s RSVP imple-
mentation generates it. When the PATH message is received by Node 1 it examines it and issues an RSVP
RESV message detailing the desired QoS and the necessary credentials bundled within a BAND-X Policy
Object. This RESV message is sent specifically to the next hop (Node 3) in the recently established reser-
vation path. The BAND-X enabled RSVP daemon on Node 3 examines the RESV message, extracts the
policy information from the message, and runs the BAND-X processing and decision making routines.
We will shortly detail the exact credentials used in this experiment but for the sake of discussion assume
that this check is made and the policy allows the reservation. Then the QoS parameters will be set on
Node 3 and it will forward the RESV message to the next hop (Node 5) in the path. This process will
continue until the RESV message reaches the sender and all BAND-X checks and reservations have been
made. Once this process is complete the reserved path is ready to be used. However, in order to keep the
reservations intact, RSVP must send periodic PATH and RESV refresh messages. If these messages are
not received by a node in the path, its reservation state will timeout and the QoS settings will be reset.
After this reservation path has been established a route failure is simulated by a simple manual change
to the routing tables on Node’s 3 and 6. The alternative route is entered into their tables and the PATH
and RESV refresh messages begin propagating through the alternative route.
Node 4 will ignore any RESV refresh messages until it receives a PATH message. When it does receive
a PATH refresh, the PATH state is created and then upon receiving the next RESV message it makes a
BAND-X policy check and if it passes on the new route the reservation is made. The reservation made
on Node 5 will timeout eventually because it will no longer receive refresh messages. The reservations


































Figure 12. After a failure in the lower branch, a new path is created via the upper branch.
4.4.2 Credentials Used
The credentials used for this experiment show a fairly straightforward use of the BAND-X system. Each
node has a policy credential of the form:
Keynote-Version: 2
Local-Constants:
ISP KEY = "rsa-base64:MEgCQQC/H..."
GC KEY = "rsa-base64:MEgCQAAE=..."
Authorizer: "POLICY"
Licensees: CG KEY && ISP KEY
Comment: This is the local policy for making bandex reservations.
Conditions: app domain == "Band-X" -> "true";
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:ab1XXA..."
The reservation request is made with four credentials. They consist of a credit institution credential
signed by the bank, a check credential signed by Alice, and two offer credentials issued from the same
ISP. The bank and check credentials are virtually identical to the example provided earlier. However,
the offer credentials differ from the ones presented in the earlier example. Most notably, there are two,





ROUTE1 KEY = "rsa-base64:MEgCQQCf05..."
ISP KEY = "rsa-base64:MEgCQQC/HQ..."
Conditions: app domain == "Band-X" && currency == "USD" &&
link name == "Dublin-NYC" && &amount >= 3.00 &&
date < "20060924" &&
flowspec service type == "CL" &&
flowspec bucket rate == "1.000000" &&
flowspec bucket size == "1.000000" &&
flowspec min unit == "1" &&
flowspec max packet == "1" -> "true";
Signature: "sig-rsa-sha1-base64:enN+vj+6..."
This offer has the Bandwidth specified as an Intserv flowspec specifying the QoS parameters. The
numbers are simply all 1’s for sake of simplicity. Note that this credential is signed by ROUTE1 KEY. Al-
ternatively, the other offer credential is identical except it is signed by a different route key (ROUTE2 KEY).
ROUTE1 KEY is stored on every node in the first path and is used as the action authorizer for the KeyNote
query when BAND-X performs its policy check. Node 4 on the other path stores a copy of ROUTE2 KEY
locally and uses that as its action authorizer in the query. Thus, when the route switches, the chain of
authorization goes through the offer credential signed by ROUTE2 KEY.
4.4.3 Results
The exercise was executed for ten trials to test whether our architecture could handle this type of service
disruption gracefully. In all ten trials the alternative route was established successfully upon failure of
the original route and all BAND-X policy decisions were executed to ensure policy compliance. To get a
rough idea of the length of service disruption such a scenario could cause we decided to introduce Node
2 as an external monitoring node. Node 2 would begin querying Node 4’s PATH and RESV state when
the routing tables were changed on Nodes 3 and 6. This monitoring allowed us to time approximately
how long it took the path and reservations to be reestablished.











The table above shows the times measured for each of the ten trials. The PATH time represents the
time in seconds it took for the RSVP daemon on Node 4 to reestablish a path state by receiving a PATH
refresh message. Similarly, the RESV time represents the time in seconds it took to receive the RESV
refresh message, perform the BAND-X policy check, and make the reservation. It is important to note
that these numbers were gathered by querying the node over the test network from the monitor node.
This was done every 2 seconds in order to limit the amount of network and processing expense. Thus
these numbers are at best off by plus or minus 2 seconds. Additionally, there was the obvious overhead
needed to perform the query. These measurements were taken simply to give a rough idea on the order
of magnitude that we were dealing with in terms of service disruption time. That being said, we can see
that the time seems to range from roughly 20 seconds to over a minute. This wide variability can be
attributed to when exactly the route failure occurs. If it occurs at an opportune moment right before a
PATH refresh message is to be sent out then the time will be relatively short. Alternatively, it could have
just missed a message and be stuck waiting for it.
We can see from the data that within the current implementation of the BAND-X system using ISI’s
RSVP implementation, that service disruption will be considerable in the case of route failure. It is
obvious that a disruption of over a minute in some cases could be unacceptable for a real-time application
requiring QoS support. This is completely a function of RSVP and its use of soft state reservations and
not a limitation on the BAND-X architecture itself. In fact, if we decrease the time between RSVP
refresh messages then we could drastically reduce the time in which the route failure is detected and
recovered from. Though, the corresponding increased load on the network from the now much larger
RESV messages could be prohibitive.
5. Related Work
5.1. Grid Computing
In Grid Computing, efforts are already underway to make the network a schedulable resource, just as
compute and data resources are. The Grid High-Performance Networking (GHPN) [35] research group,
part of the Global Grid Forum (GGF), has been formed to address issues of Grid support in optical
networks. This work recognizes the need for user controlled dynamic provisioning of network resources,
in which said resources are owned by users. Such work will be vital in allowing Grid applications to
utilize modern optical networks. [1, 15, 3, 4, 5]
Work sponsored by Canarie Inc. has lead to the development of User Controlled LightPath (UCLP)
[22], designed to allow end-users to create end-to-end light paths (optical links that allow unstructured
access to the fiber infrastructure) by combining individual segments very much as we described in the
introduction. The current systems, however, are targeted towards the academic community and hence as-
sume that end-users have the required expertise and have non-competitive usage strategies. Specifically
under the “User Controlled Light Paths” framework [22], (a) end-users have to be known by the system
in advance, (b) policy enforcement is not addressed, (c) there is no purchasing of bandwidth, since the
network is considered a common resource. In a commercial environment, a similar system must deal
with billing (i.e., how the reserved bandwidth can be paid by the user) and must support bandwidth
reservation in a scalable and secure manner.
Motivated by Canarie’s signaling approach, others [37, 21] have tried to provide autonomous domains
the ability to enforce their own management policies. This work, similar to BAND-X tries to bridge the
gap between independently managed network domains and their policies. An approach presented in
[37] foregoes the lightpath repository of UCLP and instead queries domains for their best appropriate
and available lightpath segments. This realtime lightpath search allows autonomous domains to check
local management policy at the time of the reservation request. In BAND-X, any such management pol-
icy would be a part of the offer credential that would be presented to the domain’s Policy Decision Point
(PDP). A similar approach is presented in [21] that uses dedicated AAA (authentication, authorization
and accounting) agents within domains to perform policy checks and provide an authorization token to
be presented at reservation time. BAND-X possesses some advantages to both of these architectures
when considering the centralized nature of their approaches. The presence of a single centralized “Pol-
icyServer” or “AAA agent” for each domain would provide for single point of failure. Such a problem
could occur from direct failure or through the PDP becoming isolated due to partitioning of the network
as a result of congestion, failure, or attacks. These issues could somewhat be alleviated by employing
multiple PDP’s kept in sync via replicated databases. However, these techniques would introduce their
own scalability issues for large domains. BAND-X does not suffer from such centralization problems,
at least in the reservation phase, because the policy decision is made on-site at each relevant network
element. This provides greater insurance that customers who posses a copies of Band-X offers will not
encounter reservations failures due to network failure of non-relevant nodes. That being said, issues
of revocation are not handled in BAND-X as they are much more difficult without a centralized policy
database. However, we feel the costs of such a limitation in a bandwidth market will be negligible in the
face of gains made from selling unused resources.
The problem of jointly enforcing a Virtual Organization’s (VO) policy and a resource’s policy has been
addressed in the literature. [31, 30]. Where a VO’s policy delegates what a user, as a member of the VO,
can do with a Grid resource. A local resource’s policy limits the user even further to actions allowed
by the resource’s owner. Theoretically, reservations could be made on routers that provide network QoS
as a schedulable Grid resource to members of a VO. The Community Authorization Service [31, 30]
is similar to BAND-X in its use of ”signed assertions”, like Keynote, to provide on-site evaluation of
policy at the resource. Users access a CAS which provides them with a signed assertion containing their
identity and provided privileges as a member of the VO. This assertion is then presented to the resource.
The resource verifies the conditions of the assertion on behalf of the VO and additionally ensures none
of its own local policies are being violated. While this system uses a similar approach to BAND-X it
was not designed to support a market for QoS reservations. BAND-X uses Keynote to achieve joint
authentication between the ISP and a credit institution that vouches for the customer’s payment. It might
be possible to develop extensions to the CAS to allow users to provide payment and credit credentials
to the service as part of the authentication. In this system it would be the ISP or a collection of ISP’s
and their customers would be in the role of a VO. The authors do not discuss such an extension to their
scheme as it wasn’t a goal but it seems possible based on their descriptions. Another system similar to
CAS is VOMS [6]. VOMS provides signed assertions that contain group membership associations of
the user. It is up to the resource to enforce any VO policy using information contained in the VOMS
assertion. [31] notes that such and approach is less centralized than CAS and will lead to difficulty
supporting dynamic VO policies.
5.2. Billing
Internet telephony (or voice over IP) is widely considered to be the “killer” application that will
convince users that they need QoS (and the higher prices this implies). This is underlined by the fact
that the literature concentrates on QoS for VoIP applications. Systems such as OSP [17] provide a way
for large organizations to settle payments related to VoIP call clearing. Although OSP is very close to
BAND-X, it does not involve the end-user, but instead concentrates on the ISPs. For example OSP only
exchanges Call Detail Records, the ISPs are responsible for handling customer billing and payment. In
other words the model is that of the traditional TELCO whereby payment is handled either via prepaid
cards, or monthly telephone bills. BAND-X is not bound to a particular signaling mechanism (such as
H.323) and provides far greater flexibility in that users that have no prior relationship with an ISP can
use the reservation protocol and pay for their bandwidth. Although many papers have been written on
market-based routing (e.g., [18], [27], [32], [34], [19]) these are concerned with the use of market-based
techniques in routers, ignoring the problems of accounting, billing and payment. BAND-X can use any
router that supports a reservation protocol (and the BAND-X extensions).
5.3. Secure QoS Reservations
A secure reservation protocol is required to provide a number of assurances including (a) that only
authorized users can make reservations, (b) that a reservation made by a user can be traced back to
that user, and (c) that users cannot make reservations over their allocated quota. These are to protect
against starvation or, perhaps even worse, denial of service that can occur when multiple unauthorized
requests result in the allocation of all available bandwidth thus preventing legitimate users from reserving
bandwidth. The above considerations imply some authentication mechanism and the use of integrity
checks on the transmitted data. OSP runs over TLS which encrypts the exchanged data. X.509 certificates
are used to authenticate both ends of a transaction. However, this secure communication is used only
for the data exchange between the ISP nodes running OSP. Customer identification is still handled
via a separate system that is operated by the ISPs and usually involves some kind of PIN or password
authentication. In [16] the actual charging is delegated to a “payment-agent” that is assumed to run on
the same machine as the user. However, no details are provided on how the “payment-agent” effects
payment.
All the systems we have looked at assume that the user trusts some provider who determines the cost
of the connection. No system tries to empower the user by providing choice. BAND-X allows the user
to select the best (as defined by the user) providers to handle the connection and makes sure that at the
end of the day everybody gets paid. This approach is far superior to the piecemeal approaches found in
the literature.
5.4. Scalability
Each reservation carries with it some overhead. This includes both protocol overhead, but also state
that must be maintained by routers for each reservation. As the number of reservations increases so does
the overhead. Unless there is some kind of aggregation of requests this overhead will ultimately define an
upper bound on the number of reservations that can be accommodated by the existing infrastructure. The
complexity of some of the proposed systems (e.g., [25], and [16]) and the small scale of their test-beds
(e.g., 200 nodes in [23]) casts grave doubts on their ability to scale to millions of users and thousands
of network elements. Various techniques that attempt to improve scalability through aggregation are
vulnerable to abuse. For example, in [39] the authors describe request aggregation whereby multiple
requests are merged into a single larger request for the total bandwidth asked for by the individual
requests. This approach, however, may result in an upstream node declining the single request thus
denying access to all the requests, even through some of the individual requests could have gone through
[36].
Since BAND-X covers both reservation and payment, the problem of scalability has to be addressed
in both areas. As far as reservation is concerned, BAND-X uses the RSVP protocol and so can take
advantage of the optimizations and efficiencies that have either been integrated, or are being considered
for inclusion into the protocol. In the area of billing, the use of the KeyNote-based micro-payment
architecture has been shown to scale well [10].
5.5. Signaling
The BAND-X system is not dependent on a specific signaling mechanism such as RSVP . A signaling
protocol simply provides a means for passing the BAND-X credentials to the relevant network elements.
Many signaling protocols have been proposed to address issues with RSVP in terms of per-flow overhead,
simplicity of implementation, explicit routing, and support for broader and shared resource reservation.
The YESSIR protocol [29] uses the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) to perform in-band signaling of
QoS parameters. The motivation behind the protocol is to improve upon the overhead and complexity
associated with RSVP and similar protocols. YESSIR employs a sender based reservation process to
eliminate the need for tracking of next hops that RSVP implementations must handle because of its
receiver oriented nature. RTP is used to reduce the need to modiy of existing multimedia applications
that require differential QoS and are already using RTP. Currently the protocol does not support features
for authentication. Boomerang [20], another protocol developed with similar goals, tries to limit per-
flow overhead as much as possible. It uses ICMP messages to signal network elements and simpler
QoS parameters to decrease state on routers. Boomerang achieves much smaller messages sizes than
RSVP at the cost of sacrificing some functionality. BAND-X can easily be integrated with either of
these protocols to serve as their authentication and policy enforcement mechanism. For example, in the
case of YESSIR the integration would simply involve modifying the RTCP protocol messages to include
BAND-X credentials.
6. Summary and Concluding Remarks
To minimize network congestion which can cause complaints and dissatisfaction among users, ISPs
overprovision their networks [13]. Unfortunately, unused bandwidth is wasted since it cannot be saved
for later use. While bandwidth remains cheap, the ISPs can continue to add capacity ahead of the
actual demand, but this state of affairs will only last as long as users of time-sensitive services prefer
the telephony network. The enormous cost difference between the telephony network and the Internet
provides an implicit subsidy. However, as users switch to the Internet for their time-sensitive services,
ISPs will no longer be able to expand their networks. We believe that the framework described in
this paper offers a migration path for both users and ISPs through the creation of an open market for
bandwidth over the Internet. The reason is that the BAND-X framework supports a competitive market
offering transparency, and security. At the same time the low overheads of the BAND-X framework
ensure scalability through the use of a micro-payment environment.
The benefits offered by BAND-X include: (a) “instant” purchases of bandwidth and advanced pur-
chases allowing the ISPs to plan ahead their resource allocation strategies, while being able to auction
off unused capacity rather that letting it go at Best-Effort prices, (b) efficiency, requiring only a few
exchanges between a buyer and sellers to effect a reservation. Moreover, the use of the KeyNote-based
micro-payment framework provides system-wide efficiency and scalability, (c) compatibility with ex-
isting standards: by utilizing an existing reservation protocol (RSVP), a BAND-X system may be be
deployed with minimum disruption. (d) trades between parties that have no established business rela-
tionships: The Credit Institution(s) link buyers and sellers, thus allowing a transaction to go through
without the need for a buyer to be known to the seller. This is a key requirement for the bandwidth
market to work freely with the buyer being able to select the seller offering the best value for money. (e)
openness: the BAND-X model allows the presence of multiple entities for each role (i.e., we can have
multiple Credit Institutions, Clearing Houses, buyers and sellers) operating within a single market. This
increases the competition and overall reliability of the entire system.
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